Al-Majallah report by ‘Afaf Zyn

Mogadishu — When the UN Security Council decided to end the UN operation in Somalia on 31 March, its decision won unanimous support. It was described as “a turning point in Somalia’s history” and the history of the United Nations. Resolution 954 addressed a political message to the commanders and leaders of the Somali factions that “the United Nations and its member states have become impatient with political games,” particularly after the UN `Restore Hope’ operation had accomplished its objective in ending starvation. The United Nations urged the warlords in Somalia to exercise a national sense of responsibility and achieve a solution to take their country out of the ruins of civil war. The `Restore Hope’ operation in Somalia, at the beginning of December 1992, was led by American forces. These forces arrived at Mogadishu’s shores at the height of a chaotic situation caused by armed confrontations between Somali militias, united by their desire to topple President Siad Barre’s regime. President Barre’s rule ended on 27 January 1991 after 22 years in power.

During this period, Somalia became a member of the Arab League and established close relations with the Red Sea countries, led by Saudi Arabia. Seven months after the withdrawal of the UN forces, including the U.S. forces, from Somalia on 31 March and the Somali leaders’ assumption of power, all signs indicate that an almost certain confrontation will again take place between the warlords and yesterday’s allies, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid and interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Because Somalia enjoys an important strategic position in the Red Sea area, attention in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt, and the North African belt is again focusing on this country where developments can have different effects on the Horn of Africa region, which is vital to regional security and peace.

Two weeks before the UN forces began withdrawing from Somalia, Robert Oakley, special envoy of Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton to Somalia, stated in Nairobi that “following the withdrawal of the UN forces, the situation in Somalia could deteriorate to something similar to the violence in Afghanistan.” When Al-Majallah asked him to clarify what he meant, he said: “The Somali factions, including Gen. Farah Aidid, must quickly reach a new formula to share power and rebuild the country’s institutions. Otherwise, the institutional vacuum in the country, coupled with the political vacuum — in the absence of an executive authority acceptable to all the parties — will lead the country to a dangerous situation similar to what exists in Afghanistan. There, factions united by their resistance to foreign presence began fighting each other when the Soviets departed, because they were anxious to divide the Soviet occupier’s legacy.”

One of Oakley’s noticeable activities during the relief conference in Nairobi was his meeting with Aidid. The strange thing was that a few months before this meeting, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, the UN secretary general’s special envoy to Somalia, offered a $25,000 reward to anyone leading to Aidid’s arrest. The command of the UN forces had accused Aidid of being responsible for the armed ambush in Mogadishu, on 8 June 1993, in which eight U.S. marines were killed. Aidid’s supporters opened fire at the American soldiers at the height of the hostilities in Somalia, which spread in response to inflammatory slogans by Aidid. He was implementing a plan to win the support of the Somali people, who are inflamed by hot political slogans, at a time when all political values had been destroyed with the fall of the first and the last president of a free and united Somalia. From a fugitive who disappeared from the sight of UN forces to a “national leader” busy recasting his role at the expense of the people’s sufferings, Aidid changed several political roles within a few months.

The Somali National Alliance (the grouping of pro-Aidid factions) held a conference in southern Mogadishu on 25 June 1995. At the end of this conference, the alliance announced the appointment of Aidid as president of Somalia for three years and authorized him to extend his term by another two years, if necessary. Aidid’s government won Libya’s recognition when it was announced. What is strange is that the notables of the Habr Gedir-Sa’ad tribe, to which Aidid belongs, held a conference four days earlier and removed Aidid from his post as chairman of the United Somali Congress, the political framework of this tribe. Interim President Ali Mahdi rejected the election of his opponent, Aidid, describing the whole affair as “a comedy that will not help solve the situation in this vital part of the Arab and African worlds.”

Despite this rejection with which Aidid’s ambitious plan was met by his clansmen and later by his political rival, interim President Ali Mahdi, Aidid has continued with his plan, undisturbed, relying on an international blessing, which he apparently won during his meeting with American envoy Robert Oakley on the sidelines of the relief conference in Nairobi. Considering the famous political saying that “there are no permanent friendships, but only permanent interests,” is it in the interest of the United States for Somalia to witness the birth of the second modern state at the hands of Aidid? What reasons make the U.S. Administration want to cooperate with Aidid and help him rebuild the Somali state when earlier it supported the UN decision to declare Aidid an outlaw and to offer a fat financial reward for anyone leading to his arrest?

More than a month before Aidid declared his state in southern Mogadishu and during a news conference he held in the Somali capital on 13 May, the Somali Islamic organization “Jihad-al-Islam” threatened to launch a war against all the factions if they do not find a solution to the political impasse in Somalia within two months. A spokesman for Jihad-al-Islam said at a news conference that “the Islamic organizations will declare a holy struggle [al- jihad al-muqaddas] to liberate the country, save the Somali people, and establish the rule of Islamic law [shari’ah].” Shaykh Abbas Bin Omar, the Jihad-al-Islam’s spokesman, called on all the Somali Islamic factions to unite under one banner to launch the holy struggle. He noted that “thousands of youths have begun arriving at the headquarters of the Islamic organizations offering to defend the interests of the simple people, who have become the fuel in the warlords’ struggle for power and gains.” Shaykh Abbas Bin Omar said that his organization constitutes “a new authority, which emerged at the appropriate time to save the Somali people from the disasters of civil war.”

The Jihad-al-Islam’s spokesman revealed that his organization has obtained “complete support from the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan and other neighboring states,” which he did not name. The emergence of a political Islam movement in Somalia and the announcement that it is ready to play a serious political role to rebuild the state was one of the most significant political developments in this country, where state institutions fell with the fall of its first president after independence. The Somali people are mostly Muslim, living in rural areas where tribal institutions play a vital role in running their social and political lives. Religious organizations never clashed with the government security authorities during Siad Barre’s rule. Religious societies worked for the public interest. They were involved in social activity. They had no political ambitions to play a national role and become an influential player in the political arena. With the fall of Siad Barre’s regime and the outbreak of civil war, all the warlords burned their cards, leading to the creation of a dangerous political vacuum. This situation worsened with the unexpected UN decision to withdraw from Somalia. This political vacuum was created before Somalia could stand on its feet again to rebuild itself and restore the state institutions under a strong central government that would spare the country the evil of division into small states, such as the Northern Somali State, which revived the Northeastern Somali State in 1993. Thousands of Somalis have escaped from the militias and from hunger and sickness on small boats to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, it was not surprising, in this atmosphere, to see the emergence of political Islam movements in Somalia, led by the Jihad-al-Islam Movement. They embarked on an ambitious national role to rebuild the state institutions, aided by their humble experience and guided by political principles suggested by the Taliban Movement or other Islamic governments in the region or the Islamic world. A review of the struggle in Somalia shows that political Islam movements in the country have blatantly and illegitimately been subjected to Aidid’s opportunism. One month after the UN “Restore Hope” operation began in Somalia, the political Islam movements, in November 1992, adopted a strategic decision to secretly establish an alliance with Aidid to fight the U.S. and UN presence in Somalia. They did not want to make this public to avoid several problems. This strategy served Aidid’s interests. He was planning to confront the UN and the American forces to force them to recognize him as the sole party in Somalia to succeed Siad Barre. This alliance continued while the UN forces were in Somalia.

When the United Nations began planning to withdraw its forces and preparations were made for Somali peace talks in Addis Ababa, Aidid surprisingly arrived in Ethiopia on board an American military aircraft. A U.S. Marine force also accompanied him to the airport in Mogadishu and made sure he got on the American military aircraft parked on the runway. All the observers who attended the Somali reconciliation conference in Ethiopia realized that Aidid’s political role was taking a new turn with Washington’s blessings. The United States changed its position toward the primary warlord in Somalia, thinking it was dealing with an established fact. After he used the Islamic groups to fight the UN forces and obtain recognition, Aidid turned against these groups during the Addis Ababa conference, promising to remove them from any political function to rebuild Somalia.

Some Eritrean and Ethiopian sources say that Aidid promised to give the U.S. Administration all the information it needed about the political Islam movements in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa states. A few days after the conference in Addis Ababa, U.S. President Bill Clinton sent an important message to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, which, according to The Washington Post, said that “the American aid to establish the Somali police force will come from the 1994 budget for peacekeeping operations. We have decided to provide $12 million for the establishment of the police force in Somalia.”

According to the latest reports from Somalia, citing people who have recently arrived in London, Aidid has begun taking several measures to consolidate his authority. The destroyed ministries’ buildings have been restored to house his government’s administration. Ministers in Aidid’s government have begun reporting to work regularly every morning. Aidid’s police forces have begun collecting the heavy weapons from the tribal militias that supported him. The heavy equipment and weapons will be painted in one color in preparation for the establishment of a single Somali Army. Former police officers and army soldiers are being regrouped, and centers have been opened for their training and rehabilitation. Aidid’s private militia has undergone training and has been turned into a force for his personal protection. On the administrative level, reports from Mogadishu indicate that Aidid has imposed taxes on many imported goods and private property.

At the same time, Aidid pumped about 50 billion Somali shillings ($5 million) into the money market to revive trade and the economy. At the beginning of October, the Islamic Conference Organization convened a conference for all Somali factions in Jeddah. Aidid himself did not attend the conference, but he sent a delegation. This conference ended with an important political statement, calling for a preparatory conference in Somalia before the end of November to form an acceptable national government and try to end the war between the tribes. The conference also called for the adoption of the shari’ah as a source of legislation in Somalia.

Al-Majallah asked Ali Hassan, a prominent Aidid adviser in London, why the general did not attend the Jeddah conference. He said: “The general received an invitation addressed to him as the leader of the United Somalia Congress and not as the legitimate president of the country.” The strangest thing in Aidid’s behavior is that he is a president striving for legitimacy that he does not have. Will Aidid’s sole legitimacy be the irreversible legitimacy?