Article by Jean-Pierre Langellier originally posted in The Guardian Weekly, republished in The Jerusalem Star Vol. 1 No. 16, pg. 10

Nairobi — Four months after hostilities suddenly fired up on the Somali-Ethiopian border, the fighting has come to a standstill. The sharp clashes of the opening weeks have given way to a war of attrition that often amounts to sporadic firefights between opposing patrols. The number of troops involved is practically at the same level that diplomatic sources in Mogadishu speculated early In July.

On one side is a combined fighting force of between 6,000 and 10,000 men, most of whom are regular Ethiopian army troops backing up some 2,000 dissidents belonging to the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), who are more familiar with the terrain and serve chiefly as scouts. The SDSF troops are heavily armed and have tanks and effective artillery and are provided with air cover (Mig-23s and 21s).

On the other side, the Somali army has fielded only 2,500 men. Its artillery is so-so and it has no air support. Despite all the evidence, the SDSF continues to claim, especially in broadcasts from its radio station Radio Halgan, that it is getting no outside help, while Addis Ababa clings to its contention that the dispute is an internal one. The Somalis counter by producing the bodies of Somali soldiers found on the battlefield and displaying captured troops, some of whom were recently shown in Mogadishu.

The Somali authorities’ maps mention two theatres of operation. In the Galdagub region, the invaders are holding the village of Ballambele, 31 kilometers inside the Somali border; and some 300 kilometers farther north, In the Mudug region, they are holding Galdogob, ten kilometers from the border. Mogadishu says that the enemy troops involved come from the Ethiopian 8th Division in the first case, and the 11th Division in the second. This has been largely confirmed by military observers, and correspondents who visited the area recently.

With their superiority in numbers, and armaments, the attackers had the resources to push on up to the road linking the north and the south of the country, and by so doing would appear to have cut Somalia into two. But they deliberately chose not to exploit their advantage. Had they continued advancing, then the myth of Ethiopian non-intervention would have been exposed.

It confirms that Ethiopia was not trying to launch a large-scale war against its neighbor, but believed the time had come to give the coup de grace to what it takes to be a tottering pro-Western regime by lending a hand to its foes. For its part, the SDSF gave itself three months to topple President Siyad Barre. Both sides underestimated his capacity to resist.

For the Ethiopians, the outcome of the operation has been rather negative. For the first time, Lt-Col Halle Mariam Mengistu finds himself cast as the villain, the aggressor – a role hitherto reserved for his foes; and his diplomatic stature has shrunk, especially In the Organization of African Unity’s view. The organization’s current president, Daniel Arap Mol of Kenya, has implicitly rejected the assumption of Ethiopian “innocence” by calling on the two states to stop fighting. The point is worth emphasizing all the more considering that in the past Kenya had always tilted towards Ethiopia.

Confronted by the threat from outside, the Somali army has closed ranks behind Barre. Its strongman, General Ali Samatar, who is also first vice-president, has also been steadfastly loyal to the president, who was triumphantly re-elected in August as head of the country’s only political party, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), which at the same time endorsed the dismissal of several of its top leaders, including General Ali Abokor, the second-ranking man in the party. Barre even proposed. to open negotiations “anywhere, any time” with Mengistu for settling the Ogaden dispute peacefully. But, Ethiopia insisted that Somalia first recognize the in violability of the border.

Somalia also used the opportunity to get its hitherto rather lukewarm American ally to provide a swift and striking demonstration of solidarity. On July 24, the United States announced it was sending “urgent military aid” to Mogadishu. Further assistance was provided on August 16 following the declaration of a state of emergency on the border with Ethiopia. In fact U.S. Air Force planes from Diego Garcia merely ferried In the “defensive” equipment which had been promised since 1980. In return for air and naval facilities at Berbera being made available to Washington.

So crying are the Somali army’s needs since its 1978 Ogaden defeat, that the previously planned supply of Vulcan anti-aircraft cannon was cancelled and replaced by less sophisticated but more indispensable equipment. When the SDSF bungled by announcing that it would abrogate the Somali-American defence agreement if it won, it played right into the hands of Siyad Barre, for whom the marks of friendship shown by Washington are an undoubted success.

It remains to be seen what part the Soviets and their allies have played in all this. Somali officers, some of whom were trained in the USSR when, Somalia was Moscow’s valued friend, swear they have intercepted orders given by Soviet advisers flying in Ethiopian helicopters. The official Soviet news agency TASS has denied any participation by an East-bloc country in the dispute. One thing is, certain; the Kremlin has been a bit, premature in rejoicing over the difficulties of a Somali regime which it says is grappling with “a real mass uprising”.