Africa Special Report, Vol. 3, No. 12, Dec. 1958, pp. 8–15

(Articles by Dr. Sergio Apollonio and Dr. Al A. Castagno: “Somalia Heads to Independence: Border Disputes, Egyptian Influence Are Thorny Problems”)

The United Nations, when it established the Italian trusteeship over Somalia, stipulated that the country should become independent in 1960. As the date of independence approaches, various pressures and problems that will face the new country are coming more sharply into focus. Some of these stem from the fact that the Somali people are not confined to Somalia but extend into significant portions of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia as well as British and French Somaliland.

Here Africa Special Report presents the opinions of two qualified observers on what Somalia’s independence in 1960 will mean for the Horn of Africa.

Part I: By Dr. Sergio Apollonio

Somalia will be independent in 1960. This fact is causing in Western circles mixed feelings of interest and anxiety. Somalia, and all the Somali people living inside or outside her disputed borders, is little known throughout the world, and has been for a long time not much cared about.

As a typical nomadic people, the Somalis have not suffered too much in the past from Western colonization. Though politically separated in five different parts (the ex-Italian colony of Somalia, British Somaliland, the small French Somaliland, the vast region of Ogaden which is Somali-inhabited but under Ethiopian control, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya), the Somalis have always moved freely with their herds and cattle, in a perennial search for water and better or less bad grazing, passing from one region to another of the whole arid, thorn-bushed Horn of Africa. Boundaries were almost meaningless to them. Colonial rule was mild enough not to upset Somali customs and traditions. Paternalism was the inspiring political principle and practice. In this way things went on for decades.

Today all has changed. Boundaries do mean something for the Somali herdsmen who cannot cross them any more to reach their grazing grounds. What has happened?

Nationalism has complicated everything now. Somali nationalism was born in Mogadiscio during the Second World War, and has grown very quickly. The first consequence has been a strong Ethiopian reaction. Ethiopian fears gave a menacing rejoinder to Somali claims over Ogaden, the vast Southeast region of Ethiopia which is entirely inhabited by Somalis. Some Mogadiscio nationalists would include Ogaden, as well as all the other Somali territories, in one sole nation, Greater Somalia, as they like to call it (but “Greater Somalia” is for the Somalis more or less what “European Unity” is for Europeans: not less idealistic and not more effective).

This frontier dispute on the “provisional administrative line” traced by the British between Ethiopia and Somalia since the second world war, and inherited by Italian trust administrators, has been dragging on unresolved for years. What is worse, it is a dispute between two African peoples — something most disgraceful and dangerous.

Dangerous Border Dispute

Border trouble is the most dramatic prospect for Somalia’s future. Not to solve it in time would be to let a destructive factor work in the whole of East Africa. The Ethiopian-Somali quarrel can easily be exploited by unscrupulous governments, opening up in East Africa a new field for the international cold war. It was to take a step against this possibility that a Somali delegation lead by Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa and by Aden Abdulla Osman, President of the Legislative Assembly of Mogadiscio, called on Haile Selassie last year, on a good will tour.

What came of it? Nothing definite except a mutual commitment — in very general terms — to relax tension. Today the Ethiopians recognize the right of Somalia to exist, and Somali claims over Ogaden have been officially dropped. This “normalization” on the surface is no little achievement for the moment, but everything has still to be settled.

Italo-Ethiopian Negotiations

In pushing border negotiations with Addis Ababa, Italian trust administrators have a decided handicap. Italy had attacked and conquered Ethiopia. She had now to negotiate on behalf of her trustee-administered Somalia, having upon her shoulders all the Fascist heritage. The psychological condition couldn’t be worse and no result at all, of course, came out of the year-long Italo-Ethiopian negotiations. The political influence of Italy in East Africa is today almost non-existent: the general impression is that Italians want to get rid of their costly Somali “affair” as soon as possible. They even flattered Somali leaders by asking for “anticipated independence” but the response has not been as it was hoped: Somalis want Italy to stay in until the end of 1960.

Another important foreign element in Somali politics is Egypt. Here we come to the crucial point. Western commentators have poured out a torrent of angry words against Nasser’s action in the Horn. Western newspapers are beating the drum of “troubles,” “general upheaval,” “anti-Western fanaticism,” which all are being stirred up by Egyptians and will burst open after 1960. But things must be looked at quite differently, in a calmer, more realistic, and above all in a more helpful way. True, the Egyptians infiltrate and are provocative, there is no doubt about it. Religious teachers sent to Mogadiscio by the famous Moslem University of El Azhar are really political agents disguised, using the holy Koran as a propaganda tool against the “white dogs of imperialism.”

But the important thing is not to condemn Egyptian manoeuvres only for the sake of Western interests and bias, whether in actual or supposed danger in the Horn, but to gain Somali confidence and friendship. This cannot be gained by talking about the struggle between “Western influence” and “Egyptian influence” over the Somalis, as if the Horn of Africa were a hunting reserve for anybody but the Somalis themselves.

Somalis react sharply anytime a Western newsman says that, although they are a helpless people living in a miserable country, they have to be helped by the West if for no other reason than to keep Somalia from falling into Egyptian hands. This seems to be the wrong attitude, and if such pessimistic articles go on being published in Western papers, the moral and psychological position of the West will only become weaker and weaker in Somalia.

Egyptian Influence Over-Emphasized

Cairo’s politicians are trying to stir up trouble and violence in the whole Horn, and possibly in Ethiopia, too, among the large Moslem minority and particularly among Ethiopian Somalis; that cannot be denied. But their actual influence in Somalia is not great at all, and has been exaggerated in Western circles.

Egyptian policy and interferences are a very controversial fact among the Somalis. Some of them are pro-Egyptian, but most of the responsible men — Prime Minister Seyyid Abdullahi Issa, the Legislative Assembly’s influential President Aden Abdulla, and a substantial part of the Somali Youth League, the major political party — are sharply against Egyptian manoeuvres. The Minister for Social Affairs, Scek Ali Giumale, a nervous and dynamic man, is one of the most hated Somali leaders in local Egyptian quarters; he is indeed mercilessly blocking their interference in the vital field of education.

New Political Party Tends Toward Egypt

A new political party has recently been formed, the “Greater Somalia League,” with overt pro-Egyptian tendencies. Its leader is Hagi Muhammad Hussein, former President of the Somali Youth League, from which he was expelled for trying to violate the democratic constitution of the party and make himself a dictator. But he is rather isolated now and his influence is only a minor one.

Somali society — and this has always to be kept in mind — still rests largely on a nomadic and tribal basis. The impact of modern political ideas on this society is quite peculiar. New ideas must adjust themselves to the country, and not vice versa. Political totalitarianism, for instance, is unthinkable in Somalia: tribal feelings are too strong to give it a basis. There are three main tribal groupings, from the north to the south: the Darod, the Hawiye and the Dighil-Mirifle. The last one is probably the largest of the three and forms the main opposition party to the present Government, the Hizbia Dighil-Mirifle. The other two represent the political basis of the Somali Youth League (the S.Y.L.). Before taking over the government responsibilities in 1956, the Hawiye and the Darod were more or less united in the S.Y.L. The exercise of power, as often happens, has revived old, deep-seated tribal jealousies and a Government crisis that broke out some months ago is being finally, but not easily, settled.

Tribalism is, of course, a negative aspect of present Somali politics. It will be overcome only by time, political education, and social and economic development. But it also has a positive value. Tribalism, in a sense, is acting as a moderating factor and will by itself prevent any mass rush towards political extremism. The only way to conduct Somali affairs is by moderation and careful consideration of peculiar interests and feelings. Political leadership has always to keep a balance between the old and the new, and the Somali leaders have quite realized it by pledging themselves to a moderate policy, both internally and abroad.

It would be real nonsense for the West to fail to recognize this plain fact and to insist on the fear that a Nasser-type dictatorship could take over in Somalia.

“The Irishmen of Africa”

It is not a rash forecast to say that any Egyptian attempt to get control of Somalia’s politics will fail as it did in the Sudan. The Somalis, though fervent Moslems, are not Arabs. They are notoriously proud and independent-minded. Many years ago a famous traveller and explorer gave a definition of them which is still very true. The traveller is Burton and his definition was that the Somalis, in the last analysis, may be considered “the Irishmen of Africa.” This may not make political life at home very easy and smooth, but will always be a prompt-acting guarantee against foreign interferences.

In considering Somalia’s problems and hopes, the first thing to do is to get rid of the anti-Egyptian obsession. For the whole Somali people, settlement of the border question and safe relations with Ethiopia are of paramount importance. The United States’ role in promoting good relations between Somalia and Ethiopia would be, of course, a major one, owing to its friendship and influence with Ethiopia. Ethiopians must be persuaded that it is in their own far-reaching interest not only to achieve a fair solution to the long delayed question as soon as possible, but also to appease the large Somali minority which will continue to stay under Addis Ababa Government. This people must be treated as Ethiopian citizens if they have to remain so. Traditional nomads shifting to and from Somaliland Protectorate have to be guaranteed protection.

There are some signs of a concerned and positive Western interest in the Horn’s problem. It is hoped that necessary measures will soon be taken to ensure political stability in the whole area. This is clearly a Western responsibility.

Part II: By Dr. Al A. Castagno

The Horn of Africa lies at the crossroads of Africa and the Arabic world. Of focal interest in the area is Somalia, now on the threshold of independence. In November 1949, the UN General Assembly resolved that the former Italian colony should receive its independence in ten years. Italy, aided by a UN Advisory Council, assumed her obligations as the Administering Authority in 1950. In two years Somalia will receive its independence and what the Somalis do, and equally important what the major powers do, will have repercussions on Northeast and East Africa.

Essentially a nomadic people, the Somalis spill out over the boundaries of the Trust Territory into the Northern Province of Kenya, the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia, British Somaliland and French Somaliland. With a population of 2,500,000, of which about one half resides in the Trust Territory, the Somalis — a Hamitic people — constitute one of the largest ethnic units of Africa south of the Sahara. Their social system is approximately the same in all five regions, and though inter-clan and intra-clan enmities have long characterized relations, these antagonisms are diminishing in Somalia.

Economically, the Somali region is one of the poorest in Africa south of the Sahara. If the rainy season is a good one, the semi-arid thorn bush country can provide adequate grazing for the livestock. Large scale food cultivation is confined to the areas along the Webbe Shebelle and Juba rivers. British Somaliland, French Somaliland, and Somalia are heavily subsidized by their respective administering powers.

The differences which exist among the segments of the population, and the divisive forces which seem to separate them, are partly offset by the sense of Somali consciousness which comes from cultural, linguistic and ethnic homogeneity.

Islam, too, has imposed a common pattern. The Somalis, with very few exceptions, belong to the Sunni sect and adhere to the Shafi’ite rite of the Shari’a. Islam continues to play an important role, but modern nationalism is the main ideological stimulus to Somali unification among the sedentary population, and it is beginning to reach the nomads who constitute 85 per cent of the total Somali population. The cultural isolation that characterizes their biblical type of social existence must eventually break down under the weight of new political institutions and concepts.

Nationalism and the West

The concern of the West is not how the growth of nationalism can be impeded, but rather how it can be accommodated and channeled in positive directions. By no means is the question subject to facile solution, for in the development of Somali nationalism there are two complex and related problems: (1) the disparity in the politico-administrative development of the five Somali inhabited areas; (2) the concept of Greater Somalia — the unification of all Somalis under one flag.

Among the Somali regions, Somalia is the most viable economically, despite the fact that she suffers a 50 per cent deficit in her balance of payments and in her internal budget. It is also in Somalia that one finds the highest degree of political maturity and nationalism. Under the aegis of the British Military Administration from 1941 to 1950, the Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.) was born and nourished by a vigorous political leadership consisting of such men as Hagi Muhammad Hussein, Abdullahi Issa, and Aden Abdullah. Its political program of independence, extirpation of tribalism, and unification of all Somalis was pursued through an efficient party organization that brought the new creed into the other four Somali regions. The other political parties were essentially tribal or regional in their orientation, but all upheld the need for detribalization and all aspired toward national unity.

The task of superimposing a Western governmental structure upon a traditional society in which there was neither governmental authority nor hierarchical organization was not an easy one. However, during the first five years the Italian Administration created district and municipal councils and a territorial council and held the first nation-wide municipal elections. In 1956, national direct and indirect elections were held. The S.Y.L. obtained a large majority of the votes cast and soon afterwards formed the first all-Somali Government and dominated a Legislative Assembly which was given full legislative powers over domestic affairs.

In the same year, all the regions and districts were somalized as were the bulk of responsible posts in the central administration. The Constitution was drafted in 1958 and, if adopted in its present form, it will provide the state with approximately these same institutions, with a president replacing the Administrator.

Only foreign affairs and defense remain in the hands of the Administering Authority and Somalis are occupying key positions in both areas. The Administrator has the power of veto, but is cautious in exercising it. It should be added that this swift devolution of authority is accompanied by one of the largest education programs ever instituted in Africa. Many observers agree that Somali political and administrative officials have made considerable progress in assuming the responsibilities of modern government.

Of the four other Somali regions, French Somaliland (with a population of 63,000 Danakil, Somalis and Arabs) seems to be making the most headway in meeting the demands for self-government. In 1957 the legislative organ, which previously had only a modicum of power, was given almost complete authority over legislation dealing with domestic affairs.

In June of the same year, national elections based on universal suffrage were held and by August a Council of Government was formed with Mahmoud Harbi, leader of the majority party, the Union Republicaine, as its vice president (premier). Four ministerial posts went to the Somalis, two to the Danakil, one to an Arab and one to a European. This division of positions reflected the greater political vitality of the Somalis in comparison to the Danakil, a Muslim group to which the Somalis claim close ethnic affinity. However, these political gains are not matched in central and local administration where there are very few Somalis or Danakil holding responsible positions.

In the Protectorate of Somaliland (pop. 600,000), the British Administration began devolving political authority in 1953 with the creation of agencies of local government. Despite considerable progress in this area, both moderates and extremists are taking strong issue with the “snail-pace” development in somalization and with the limited Somali representation in the Legislative Council where only 5 of the 15 seats are held by Somali members.

In its relations with the Somalis, the Administration seems to be limited by British foreign policy. In 1955, the traditional Somali grazing grounds of the Haud and Reserved Area were transferred to Ethiopian administration. This territory had been ceded to Ethiopia by Britain in 1897, but was administered by the latter country from 1941 to 1955. Ever since the transfer, the British Somalis have been suspicious of any government attempt to introduce political reforms.

The limited progress in the devolution of political authority on a national basis and the transfer question both contributed to the demonstrations and riots against the government during the early part of this year. Next year should see the introduction of electoral and somalization reforms based on recent recommendations of government committees. It is especially through the organs of government, and not through political parties, that modernism is expected to make inroads on the traditional system, since the political parties lack the vitality found among their counterparts in Somalia and in French Somaliland.

The 60,000 Somalis of the Northern Province of Kenya and the 350,000 Somalis of the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia are perhaps the most retarded politically. In Kenya, the S.Y.L. is banned, and in Ethiopia all political parties are prohibited. No institutions of local government have been developed for the Somalis in either territory. In Nairobi, an Arab represents the Northern Province in the Legislative Council, but Somalis complain that he is neither alert to nor concerned with Somali needs. At Addis Ababa, there are several persons of Somali origin in Parliament, and in the Ogaden, 17 Somalis have been assigned to district administration. In both areas, the provincial administrators have absolute power and, unlike the other Somali areas, they delegate considerable authority to the chiefs. In neither territory are there adequate social services nor do the economic programs match the substantial investments made by the governments of the other Somali territories.

Officials in Ethiopia and Kenya are prompt to point out that it is infinitely difficult to introduce modern political institutions and social reform to a people who are widely dispersed and who do not contribute substantially to the costs of modern administration. But this is met with the fact that despite the existence of similar conditions in northern Somalia and in British Somaliland, substantial progressive reforms have been, and continue to be, introduced.

The wide disparity in the political development of the five regions undoubtedly gives cause for Somalis to complain that imposing five diverse administrative systems on the traditionally homogeneous socio-political system has produced injustices. The laxity found in administrative control and the difficulties that derive from the variety of administrative procedures are regarded as the major reasons for the continuation of inter-tribal conflicts in the Somali regions. The causes of these enmities lie deeper, but it is argued that unitary administration under Somalis can aid in overcoming the obstacles which the artificial political boundaries raise against harmonious relations.

Towards a Greater Somalia

Although the Somali political and intellectual elite agree on the need for a Greater Somalia, there is some disagreement among them regarding the method by which it should be realized and the form it should take.

In British Somaliland, the moderate elements are looking forward first to some form of association between the Protectorate and Somalia. The traditional and political leaders of the National United Front (N.U.F.) and the Somali National League (S.N.L.) once pleaded for a “unification of all Somalis” and “independence within the Commonwealth.”

Somalis remember that it was ex-Foreign Minister Bevin who in 1946 proposed “lumping” together all the Somalis (if Ethiopia agreed) under a single trusteeship power, i.e., Britain, “so that the nomads could lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance (and have) a real chance of a decent economic life.”

But since 1956, the equivocal statements from the Foreign Office and the lack of a specific timetable for somalization by the Colonial Office have been partly responsible for the shift within the S.N.L. from a pro-British to a neutral or pro-Egyptian orientation and for the weakening of the pro-Commonwealth and moderate N.U.F. headed by Ahmed Hassan and Michael Mariano.

In French Somaliland, the position of the nationalists was made clear when they vigorously demonstrated against federation with France. Mahmoud Harbi, although Premier of the government, campaigned against federation on the ground that it would be a major obstacle to eventual amalgamation with the other Somali areas. He has recently been deposed by the French government for taking that stand. It is difficult to see how the new government, recently appointed by the French, will be able to resist the demands for unification which are bound to be intensified after Somalia receives its independence in 1960.

The two small Somali socio-political organizations in Nairobi, the Ishaakiya Association and the United Somali Association, do not seem to be politically involved in the question of independence, but some members nourish the hope that the Kenya Government will eventually allow Somalis of the Northern Province some form of union with Somalia.

In Somalia, the differences over Greater Somalia were partly responsible for the recent crisis in the S.Y.L. The moderate wing of the party, which includes Abdullahi Issa, Prime Minister, and Aden Abdullah, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly, became convinced of the impracticality of immediate unification of all five Somali regions. Like the pro-West Somalis in the Protectorate, these men are confining their attention to some form of union between Somalia and the Protectorate. Hagi Muhammad Hussein, S.Y.L.’s president, challenged this position by insisting that the unification of all regions be vigorously pushed by the party.

A show of strength took place last spring and after a tumultuous party session, Hussein was expelled from the party and Aden Abdullah was elected president.

New Somali Party

In June a new party, the Greater Somalia League (G.S.L.), was formed by a curious combination of pro-Britishers, pro-Egyptians, extreme nationalists and political malcontents. Hussein assumed the presidency of the new party, and although he had a poor showing in the October municipal elections, he intends to oppose the S.Y.L. in the March 1959 national elections on the issue of Greater Somalia. He is regarded as pro-Egyptian, having spent four years in Cairo, and his political campaign may have anti-Western overtones.

British officials who knew Hussein during the British Military Administration do not view him as a tool of Nasser, although he is frequently depicted as such by the British press. The S.Y.L. does not appear to be alarmed over the challenge raised by the G.S.L. but it may find that political expedience will require some change in its approach to the question of unification.

Any scheme of Greater Somalia must resolve the basic problem of clanism. The independent-minded Esa clan of French Somaliland, the Protectorate, and the Ogaden regard themselves superior to other Somali groups. The Ishaak, who inhabit the Protectorate and who comprise the bulk of the S.N.L. and N.U.F., distrust the Darod who make up the majority of the S.Y.L. adherents in the Protectorate. In Somalia, some elements of the Hawiye (who incidentally have the majority of ministerial posts) fear that a Greater Somalia will mean a Darod control of government since in the combined Somali regions it is the most numerous group. The Dighil and Mirifle groups, represented in the main opposition party (Hisbia Dastur Mustaquil), have similar misgivings which are reflected in their demand for a federated Somalia in which the regions are accorded almost full autonomy. The political leaders in the three most advanced Somali regions have made considerable progress in overcoming these traditional rivalries, but not to the extent that they can be ignored.

Enter Egypt

In the magaalos, the Somali quarters, of the major towns and villages of the Somali regions, pictures of Nasser adorn the walls of many shops. Radio Cairo, in its Somali language broadcasts, stresses the Muslim identification and emphasizes the need to “throw off the imperialist yoke.” In Cairo, hundreds of Somalis are studying at El Azhar and in the secondary schools. In Somalia, there are 65 Egyptian teachers spread out in the major villages. The Islamic Congress and the Muslim League in Mogadiscio are the two major centers for the pan-Islamic movement.

Egyptian interference in domestic politics was alleged to have been the cause of the assassination by a Somali of an Egyptian diplomat in Mogadiscio. But Egyptian relations with the Land of Aromatic Herbs did not begin with Nasser. At the time of King Assa of the Fifth Dynasty, Egyptians visited its northern shores to gather incense and aromatic herbs. If this is too remote to have contemporary value, the fact that it was King Farouk (1951) and not Nasser who initiated the Egyptian scholarship program for the Somalis should not be devoid of current significance.

Nevertheless, the basis of Egyptian interest then was cultural. Now it is political and cultural. It is essentially this Muslim identification which has stirred the Western leaders to fear the consequences of a Greater Somalia. Kenya, too, experiences a similar anxiety since some quarters view Somali unity as a first step in the Muslim conquest of East Africa.

Whether we treat Somalia alone or Greater Somalia, the fallacy of relating Muslim identification with Egyptian domination should be avoided. Undoubtedly Egypt is attempting to control the course of Somali politics and is looking forward to a Somalia run by Hagi Muhammad Hussein. But even he, like so many other Somalis, notes that although there is a need for Muslim spiritual unity, religion has no place in politics.

Identical religious affiliations did not prevent the Somali riots against Arab residents in 1947 nor did they persuade the present Legislative Assembly to embrace Arab residents and Muslim Indian residents of Somalia in its projected law on nationality. There is also a substantial pro-West group which includes the majority of the Somali police and the administrators in district and central administration who have been trained in Italy. Above all, Somalis are Somalis first and Muslims second.

One of the major international problems confronting Somalia and the question of unification is her relationship with Ethiopia. Many Ethiopians regard not only Greater Somalia but even the existence of Somalia as a threat to the Empire since 40 per cent of Ethiopia is Muslim. Ethiopians cannot forget that the ex-Italian colony was used as a major staging area for the Fascist conquest of their country. The fear now is that it can be used as a base of operations for external forces which might seek to bring about a dissolution of the Empire.

On the other hand, Somalia cannot ignore the past Ethiopian claim to the hot lowlands of the Somali coastal region, despite assurances from Addis Ababa that the Ethiopian Government has resigned itself to accepting an independent Somalia. Further, there is the long-standing and irksome boundary dispute between the two states which, if not resolved by the time Somalia receives her independence in 1960, will add greatly to the insecurity which is felt in the area and which might lead to precipitous hostile actions by either side.

Quest for Freedom

The political leaders of the three more advanced Somali territories are passionate in their quest for freedom from any form of domination emanating from any source. Despite their inclination toward the West, the need for technical assistance and economic aid will urge, if not force, them toward those nations which give this aid with a minimum quid pro quo and toward those nations which, on a long range basis, can aid the Somali leaders in working out the problems of Somali nationalism and unification. The Muslim identification will have political operational value if the rulers choose the East. But the real meaning of such a choice might be found in the inability of the Western Powers to implement policies which adequately accommodate the changes being wrought in the Horn of Africa.