The Member of Parliament for South-East Essex, Bernard Braine, gave the address which follows at a Joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society.

I was warned by a distinguished expert that when I went to the Horn of Africa I should be careful not to fall into the error which so many have done before me of seeing the Somali problem through the eye of a camel. I tried hard not to do that although I must confess that the Somalis are such an attractive and persuasive people that their case was sold to me almost before I had begun to understand it. Nevertheless, I will do my best to give you an objective account of my impressions.

Let me say at the outset, however, that I returned from my visit to Aden and the Horn of Africa firmly convinced that unless speedy, vigorous and positive action was taken by the British Government in these two areas the situation there would slide swiftly to disaster. In Aden the crisis has now come to a head. I am not surprised. It was a distressing experience to visit a British territory and to learn at first hand from protectorate rulers on the Yemen frontier that they had been cut off from contact by road from Aden colony for long months as a result of internal subversion and that they were seriously concerned as to whether we could or would protect them.

Since my return strong action has been taken by the British Government. One hopes that it will prove effective.

In the Horn of Africa, the homeland of the Somali people, the storm clouds are gathering fast. We should be wise to recognise in good time that this is no longer a remote region inhabited by a small and backward people. There are no more remote places; the world has grown too small. Moreover, even the poorest of peoples have an importance today for the rest of mankind, and a nuisance value too, which they never had before.

There are between 2 and 3 million Somalis spread over an area of some 800,000 square miles stretching from the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian Highlands and southwards across the Shebelle and Juba rivers down to the Tana in Northern Kenya. They are mostly nomads and pastoralists clinging to their ancient tribal organisations. They live in a country which is for the most part flat, semi-desert, much of it badly eroded, but providing just enough grazing to enable them to maintain the herds of camels, sheep and goats which constitute their sole wealth.

The Somalis are an attractive, virile, and intelligent people. They are strangely sensitive and excitable, and while they are great talkers and much interested in politics they are as yet politically immature. Though they have been in Africa for many centuries they are of Hamitic origin and their ancestors crossed over from Southern Arabia long ago and settled in the coastlands round the Gulf of Aden. Gradually they spread inland and southward and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became converts to Islam.

They are a restless people always on the move. Like all nomads they are no respecters of man-made frontiers; they move wherever the stock takes them in search of pasture and so very gradually as the pastures tend to become worn out there is a tendency to move farther south. In the last hundred years the movement has become marked and some of the tribes have been spilling over the frontier of Northern Kenya and pressing down towards the Tana River.

That is important to those of us who are interested in Kenya because the land along the Tana is one of the few areas in that colony where it may be necessary one day to settle surplus population. At this stage it may not be feasible to think in terms of large-scale irrigation schemes along the Tana but population increases in Kenya may make them practicable one day. In any event since we have a direct responsibility for the government of Kenya we cannot be insensitive to this downward pressure from the north.

The Somalis are divided between five countries: the former Italian colony of Somaliland, now the United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Somalia, administered by Italy as the trustee. No one quite knows how many Somalis live there; a census was carried out some time ago but it was stopped when it had totalled 7 million! In fact there are probably about 1 ¼ million people in this territory. Then there is the British Protectorate with a population of almost 650,000. French Somaliland has about 30,000. The Ogaden, a province of Ethiopia, has about 450,000. Finally, there must be some 50,000 or 60,000 Somalis living in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.

Yet despite this division and the fact that the tribes are divided among themselves and ridden by suspicion of one another, the Somalis clearly form a distinct and compact racial group. They speak the same language, they have the same religion and customs and at heart they feel themselves to be one people.

Here I should say something about the historical background because it is fundamental to any understanding of this complex question. After the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 the Ogaden was joined to Italian Somaliland and from 1941, when we expelled the Italians from East Africa, up to 1950, practically the whole of the Somalilands were under British administration.

The world was then moving in the direction of unification; race consciousness was growing. Somali hopes for unification were raised only to be dashed to the ground when the British proposals after the war for a United Somalia were successfully vetoed by the Soviet Union and the Americans. Finally, in 1949 the United Nations decided the former Italian colony of Somaliland by itself should become an independent country by 1960 and in the interval should be administered by the Italians. This was not a happy decision but to be fair the Italians have not done a bad job. They have invested a great deal of money in the country though they have also taken a great deal out. Moreover, they have helped the Somalis to think in terms of standing on their own feet.

Nevertheless, in the Somalilands as a whole it is not surprising that people should feel that their natural desire for unity has been frustrated by the machinations of the great powers. They desire unity and they mean to secure it.

Somalia holds the key to the situation. What happens there will govern what happens elsewhere in the Horn. Unfortunately the tempo of events is quickening. Even if Western statesmen had until 1960 to devise a solution to the problems of this region which would ensure stability and retain the friendship of the people the time would be very short. But events are now moving so fast that Somalia is likely to attain her independence much sooner. My impression was that the Italian administration on the spot is well aware of this and is anxious to withdraw. Indeed, since the assassination of one Egyptian member of the United Nations Commission in Mogadishu last year the Italian administrators have been busily divesting themselves of responsibility. No doubt their object is to maintain as much goodwill with the Somalis after independence as may be possible; they have an economic stake in the country and wish to preserve it; and they may well be considering the larger question of maintaining good relations with Egypt and other Arab countries.

Whatever the truth of the matter Somali ministers are now firmly in the saddle and the police and local administration are under Somali control. What is more, the ministers whom we were privileged to meet appeared to be quite sure of themselves, and looking forward very much to independence. And this may come very soon. The Italian Administrator, Signor Anzilotti, told the Legislative Assembly on October 16th last year that if the Somalis were not prepared to co-operate, Italy would tell the United Nations that she was ready to give up the mandate and he went on to say that if the Somalis, through their elected representatives, requested Italy to withdraw she would do so.

This request may soon be made. The present Assembly comes to the end of its life in June. Elections will be held between July and September and a draft constitution for an independent state, prepared by the local U.N. Commission, will be ready for submission to the new Assembly soon after. Thus, the Somalis in this part of the Horn of Africa may attain independence much sooner than we had ever calculated.

The Prime Minister, Abdullahi Issa, whom I had the pleasure of meeting, is an able, energetic and ambitious man. My impression is that he desires not merely good relations with the West but what is more significant desires good relations with Ethiopia. But he faces opposition from factions inside his own party, the Somali Youth League (SYL) and is not likely, therefore, to put himself in a position where he may appear less enthusiastic for an early withdrawal of the Italians and the attainment of independence than his pro-Egyptian rivals, led by the President of the SYL, Haji Mohamed Hussein.

On the day after the Prime Minister left for Addis Ababa, last December, to have talks with the Emperor about the possibility of improving relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, Haji Mohamed Hussein returned to Mogadishu from his self-imposed exile in Egypt. There is an intense rivalry between these two men and it is very much in the balance as to which of them will come out on top in the elections this summer.

We must be careful not to think of these problems always in Western terms. Somalia is never likely to be economically viable. There is a frantic search for oil going on but none has been found. Great difficulties will arise, therefore, if the Italians withdraw before the question of external aid has been settled. But this prospect does not dampen ardour for independence. One leading Somali expressed it quite simply, “We would rather have our freedom without aid than to have aid and suffer tutelage.” All this is perfectly well understood in Cairo and I have no doubt that it is figuring in the discussions which are now taking place between Colonel Nasser and Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow. Yet up till now no hint has been dropped by either the British Government or the United States administration as to what line they propose jointly or singly to take. I would say that the delicacy and difficulty, as well as the urgency of the situation, has been made perfectly plain to our own Government by our people on the spot.

If nothing is done it will be regrettable, not merely because of the political repercussions, but also because there is so much goodwill towards us in Somalia. Indeed, leading Somalis went out of their way in their talks with me to pay tributes to Britain and to the Commonwealth. I felt that this was not done just to be polite but because there was a genuine and widespread appreciation of the fact that it was Britain who gave the Somalis their first taste of freedom. One of the foremost political figures in the country told me that Britain by her conduct in India and Ghana had demonstrated her desire to come to terms with the changing world and that this had made a deep impression upon him. We even had inquiries as to the possibility of an independent Somalia joining the Commonwealth.

Judging by what the Prime Minister and others told me the amount of aid which an independent Somalia would need would not be very great. Certainly it would be a fraction of the money we have given to Jordan in recent years. But my view is that unless some tangible and sensible offer is made before the elections then those Somalis whose present disposition is to look to the West may be forced to look elsewhere in order to avoid being outsmarted by their rivals. True, this is a game which many countries are playing—”if the West will not help us we will look to the East,” but it is a dangerous game not merely for those who play it but for ourselves too and before slamming the door we have to be very careful to weigh up the issue at stake, and to consider how far our true interests are involved.

My own feeling is that the Egyptians and Russians are conscious of the importance of this part of the world. Members of the Soviet Embassy staff in Addis Ababa visited Mogadishu earlier this year and expressed interest in the problems and needs of the country. Egypt not only conducts incessant and virulent radio propaganda but offers practical aid in the shape of scholarships for higher education and training for teachers. I found it both ironical and disturbing that in a country so well disposed towards us and hungry for education, English should be taught by Egyptian teachers.

These developments are having a disturbing effect upon our own Protectorate. Our administration there could be faced with an extremely difficult, perhaps impossible task, once Somalia attained independence.

I was fortunate in being accompanied by a Labour colleague from the House of Commons. We got on very well together and saw eye to eye on most of the problems we encountered. Certainly in the Protectorate we were both impressed and depressed by what we saw and heard. No effort was spared by the administration to help us meet the people. We met nearly half the chiefs and every political figure of importance, including the President of the moderate National United Front, Ahmed Hassan, and his vice-president, Michael Mariano, a most able and attractive personality. At the end we were left in no doubt as to what the protectorate Somalis wanted, and that was union with an independent Somalia as soon as possible within the British Commonwealth.

Now this is neither unnatural, nor unexpected. In 1956 Lord Lloyd, then Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office gave a firm undertaking that “Her Majesty’s Government would be prepared to consider the possibility of some form of association between Somaliland and Somalia after 1960. Her Majesty’s Government would certainly discuss any such proposals with representatives of the people of the Protectorate and if political and economic conditions were propitious, and the proposals were both well-conceived and favoured by the Somalis concerned, Her Majesty’s Government would be ready to support them in principle.” The statement also included details of the kind of steps which H.M. Government proposed in order to bring the Somalis to the point where they could enter such a Union on reasonably equal terms.

That statement may have suited the conditions of 1956. It does not meet those of 1958. For one thing it is clear that the issue of association with Somalia will have to be faced much earlier than we expected and before any real advance has been made in the Protectorate towards internal self-government. I quickly sensed that feeling in this British territory was far less friendly towards us than it had been in Somalia. There was, of course, the unfortunate incident in which we were involved at Berbera where an angry mob stoned our car. I would not wish to exaggerate its importance—indeed the affair had its amusing side. Banners carried by the demonstrators bore such inscriptions as “Actions speak louder than words”, and “The Meek shall inherit the earth”. The latter was carried by a man who used his free hand to beat the bonnet of our car with a club! Though we were greeted with great courtesy and kindness everywhere else we went in the Protectorate, we found people impatient, irritable and very outspoken in their criticisms and if I felt that they were sometimes unfair in their strictures, there were as I discovered to my sorrow, understandable reasons for their attitude. Indeed, it is a sad and melancholy tale.

The first reason is deep-rooted in history and there is nothing that we can do about it now, but since it conditions the thinking of our Somalis it must be mentioned. Briefly, in 1897 we feared that the Ethiopians might assist the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan and sought to buy them off by handing over about one-third of the Protectorate to them. This was the Haud and the Reserved Area embracing some 25,000 square miles of the best grazing land in the Protectorate. When one realises that the Somalis are a pastoral people and that half of them spend four to eight months in this area every year grazing new livestock or growing a crop it can be readily grasped that this is a matter which touches upon life or death. Yet our Somalis remained in complete ignorance of the 1897 treaty until the activities of the Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission in the early thirties brought it to light. The reaction was violent. A member of the Commission was killed. Bitterness was great among the Somalis.

Then came the Italian conquest of Ethiopia when the Haud was transferred to Italian Somalia. A few years later the Italians were driven out and there began our own occupation. What the Somalis cannot understand is why, when we had the opportunity during that occupation, we did not reunite the Haud with the Protectorate. One man put it to us that “it is much harder to be injured by a friend than to be wounded by an enemy”. This was at a great meeting of chiefs which we attended. He went on to say, “We would forgive you for what you did in 1897; what we cannot forgive is that when you had the opportunity of righting the wrong you did not restore the Haud to the Protectorate”.

It is always easy to have hindsight, to look back and see what you should have done at a time when entirely different conditions prevailed. In 1941 we were engaged in a war for survival. We declared that we had no territorial ambitions. Be that as it may, the fact is that the Somalis do not see it that way—we did not take back the Haud and, to add crowning insult to injury, in 1954 we entered into an agreement with Ethiopia in which we solemnly reaffirmed the 1897 treaty and did not deign to tell the Somalis until after the document had been signed.

All this rankles deeply. It is not just a matter of prestige. It is something that touches upon the struggle for existence. For the lives of these people are hard; they live upon the narrowest of margins. They depend for dear life upon the camel and the camel cannot live without grazing and water. In defence of the British Government’s actions, however, it must be said that it was genuinely thought that the 1954 agreement was a good bargain. We could not challenge the legality of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Haud but we were able to obtain certain undertakings which, we thought at the time, would give us power to safeguard the interests of our tribesmen.

For example, the Ethiopians agreed that there should be British liaison officers in the area able to move about freely, that disputes between British protected tribes could be settled in the courts of the Protectorate, although disputes between our tribesmen and Ethiopian Somalis had to be settled in the Ethiopian courts. Unfortunately, as not merely the Protectorate Somalis but the British administrators on the spot affirm, the agreement is becoming unworkable. For one thing it was not specific as to what tribes were affected.

The liaison machinery applies only to nomads but as there are an increasing number of British Somalis who go into the Reserved Area and settle down for a season to grow crops, the Ethiopians claim that they are not nomads and must be Ethiopian subjects. Attempts were made to install “quisling chiefs and to suborn our people from allegiance to their traditional leaders.

At present all is quiet in the Haud for the grazing is plentiful. But if drought should occur the gravest difficulties will arise. At the meetings we attended in the protectorate we were told repeatedly that Britain had betrayed the Somali people and since it appeared that we had neither the will nor the strength to fulfil our part in the Protectorate treaties, we should depart.

There was another reason for the current bitterness in the protectorate which I must mention. It is the widespread belief that we have failed to develop its human and economic resources. Now this is hardly fair. It is true that in many respects the Protectorate is lagging behind Somalia but it is not true that we are entirely responsible for this.

The Protectorate Somalis long resisted the introduction of education and even now they are obstructionists in many matters, especially in attempts to control soil erosion. But it is not what the facts are that really matters, it is what the people think the facts to be. And they know that our administration has not been moving with anything like the speed and sense of purpose that the situation demands. Somalia has an elected Assembly; she has an array of ministers (they may or may not be competent but in this context this hardly matters for it is not competence that matters but power); and she knows that independence is round the corner. In the protectorate, on the other hand, there is not yet an elected element in the Legislative Council.

Though, we have a Constitutional Commission at work which is due to report in about two months’ time. But everyone knows in advance that elections as we understand them could not be held for the simple reason that about half of the population spends about half of the year outside the Protectorate and in Ethiopia, and that the 1954 Agreement expressly lays down that there shall be no political activity in the Haud or Reserved Area.

Clearly, therefore, some new approach is necessary. Yet the problem is not insoluble. The Somalis practice a national democracy and it would not be impossible to get a representative element into the Legislature now by a system of nomination, using the chiefs as a kind of advisory body.

I confess to you that I found it extremely hard to be told by chiefs that they had been proud to live under British protection in the past but “our people have not got the confidence in Britain that they used to have.” It was humiliating to hear it said that Somalis under our protection were more backward than those living in Somalia. And it was disturbing to be told that many, influenced by Egyptian propaganda, were thinking of turning to other powers. When I pointed out the dangers of such a course, one chief replied, more in sorrow than in anger, “if the camel is to be eaten by the hyena does it matter whether the hyena comes from the west or from the east?”

These were not the views of a mere handful of dissatisfied chiefs and politicians. I have visited many parts of the world during the last ten years where the tide of nationalism has been running strongly, where there is dissatisfaction with the existing order and a passionate desire for change but almost everywhere one can detect differences between the more conservative folk in the rural areas, the traditionalists, and the older people on the one hand and the detribalised intellectuals and young people in the towns. It is the difference between those who fear themselves rooted in the past and those who look towards the future. But this is not the case in Somaliland. Here no such distinction can be drawn. The chiefs and the detribalised townsmen, the young and the old all speak the same language, all are equally dissatisfied, all seek the same goal. All of them, rightly or wrongly, feel that we have failed in our duty as the protecting power.

Lord Lloyd’s policy statement assumed that steps would be taken to encourage Somalis to assume greater responsibility.” Well, the Constitution Commission is at work. One can only hope that drastic and urgent steps are taken to ensure that representation in the Legislature is broadened, that Somalisation of the public services is speeded. But even if all this happens, events in Somalia may well overtake us.

Much of the present dissatisfaction in Somalia as well as in the protectorate is the belief, encouraged by Egyptian propaganda, that the Ethiopians have ambitions to swallow up the Somalilands, are being encouraged in this by the Americans, and think we do nothing about it because we do not want to offend our allies. There may have been a time when the Americans thought it logical that something like this should happen. Certainly the Emperor was thinking on these lines as recently as 1956. But I doubt if the Americans have any firm ideas on the subject today. Indeed, I doubt if they think very much about the area at all. There was an American consul in Mogadishu but no Somali minister had ever spoken to him and one wondered why he was there.

We went to Addis Ababa and had the great honour of meeting the Emperor. We were also able to talk about these matters with his Foreign Minister. If the Emperor did once dream of extending his dominions to the Indian Ocean I do not think he does so today. For he is a realist and a firm friend of the West. He sees Nasser establishing himself at both ends of the Red Sea. He sees the Russians building a naval base in the Yemen opposite his only outlet to the sea.

If anyone doubts that he desires a friendly Somalia on his flank let me remind him of the visit that the Somali Prime Minister paid to Addis Ababa last December. Nobody had ever thought that Somalis would talk to Ethiopians but they did so, and the meeting was a tremendous success. The Emperor made it plain that he looked forward to Somalia attaining her independence and expressed the hope that the two countries could be friendly. The assumption which many people have made not only here but in Cairo and perhaps in Moscow that Somali hostility to the Ethiopians is permanent and cannot be eradicated is altogether too hasty.

One hopes that it is wholly wrong. Certainly the Prime Minister told me that he believed that it was possible for Somalia and Ethiopia to live together in peace. This makes it important that the present ruling elements in Somalia should be helped now for if they go down to the pro-Egyptian faction it would not be difficult to stir up trouble between the Somalis and the Ethiopians. And then how effective a bastion would Ethiopia be for the West if she was flanked by hostile Somalis. The situation in that part of the world is critical enough already.

What use would Ethiopia be if the Horn and Aden slipped out of our control? Thus, it is of paramount importance, not merely to the pro-western elements in Somalia but the Ethiopians for ourselves and the Americans to come to an understanding about this part of the world to do what is necessary to ensure its stability and to do it quickly.

Nor should we forget that if the Somalilands fall into the Egyptian net Kenya would be in the front line. Mr. Albu and I were the first Britons to talk with the formidable Haji Mohamed Hussein, President of the Somali Youth League, after his return from Egypt. He was perfectly frank with us. He told us that his aim and ambition is the unification of all five Somalilands. He even hinted that he was ready to reach out to the other Hamitic peoples of Kenya and Ethiopia. I put a question to him bluntly. “Do you mean that wherever there is a Somali there is Somalia.” His reply was “Yes.” I have no doubt that his mandate is to create uncertainty and if this leads to chaos and disorder so much the better.

Thus, what happens in Somalia in the next six months will probably determine the future of the Horn of Africa. There is a chance, in my opinion, of keeping the Somalis in the western camp. It is a slender chance and we shall succeed only if we move with the greatest possible deliberation and speed. The minimum requirements are these. We should make our position crystal clear in regard to the financial and technical aid that we are prepared to give to Somalia once she attains her independence, and what additional steps, constitutional, economic and administrative, we are prepared to take in our own Protectorate to enable the people there to catch up with their mothers in Somalia and to join with them on reasonable terms – and to do all this with the utmost speed.

One has only to look at the map to see what vital British interests are involved, if the Horn and Aden go. Our access to vital oil supplies could be threatened, our air communications could be cut and the “back door” into East and Central Africa would be thrown wide open to Egyptian and Russian penetration. A little generosity and imagination exercised now could save both our pockets and our pride tomorrow.

Discussion period

The CHAIRMAN asked if Mr. Braine could say anything about the extent of the direct links between the statesmen or the party politicians or even the populations of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland.

Mr. BRAINE replied that he thought there were a number of links, but he did not know enough about it to express an opinion. He was impressed by the way in which people in Somalia talked about the conditions in the Protectorate and those in the Protectorate would talk about events in Mogadishu. It was clear that leading Somalia were watching one another closely across the borders, and felt that they shared a common destiny. When it came to liaison between administrations he was unable to com ment except to say that all our people on the spot, the Governor in the Protectorate and his officers, the Consul General in Mogadishu and the Ambassador in Addis Ababa, all of whom were doing a magnificent job with very limited resources, were in close touch with one another, saw the problem in the same way and were reporting back to London the same tale. The important thing was to make sure that the policy makers in London saw the problem with something like the same clarity and urgency.

Asked if he could say whether there was political traffic between Ethiopia and Somaliland, Mr. BRAINE replied that there had been the meeting last December to which he had referred which had ended in a useful and constructive communique. Unhappily, one found amongst the Somalis not merely suspicion but sometimes hatred of the Ethiopians. Fortunately there were men in Somalia who thought that it would be possible to arrive at an honourable and satisfactory accommodation with Ethiopia after independence. He would say that whatever the relations were before the visit to Addis Ababa, providing the present Prime Minister survived the elections and if he was given aid to enable him to keep his country stable, there could be peace and understanding with the Ethiopians. There were differences, frontier difficulties and disputes. The feeling between our own Protectorate peoples and the Ethiopians was quite different because of the Hand so he was not making light of the problem but he thought it wrong to rule out completely the possibility of friendship between the two peoples.

Asked what impression he got from the Emperor about the possibility of a United Somalia, Mr. BRAINE said he did not ask that question of the Emperor, but the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and some of his colleagues had said that they would be happy to see an independent Somalia, that they had no objection to a linking up with our protectorate provided there was no question of any challenging of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Ogaden. That was the only basis on which there could be understanding. He was not saying whether it was right or wrong, but if one wanted peace and stability at some time or other there had to be an agreement and one had to give something up. The fact is that the Ethiopians are prepared today to recognise the existence of an independent Somalia to which the British Protectorate had been added with perhaps frontier rectification in Kenya.

Another speaker said that Mr. Braine had spoken of the need to give aid from the west to the Somalis and to the Protectorate. He had spoken of the passionate resentment felt by the Somalis because of what they called the handing over of the Hand, did he think that even if the west could give technical and economic aid, the resentment over the Hand was so strong that the Somalis would take what they could get from the west but would pay the greatest heed to anyone who appeared to offer them a hope of getting the Hand and that might well be the answer.

Mr. BRAINE said that he did not know whether the Somalis were politically astute enough to conduct a campaign and policy of that kind, all he could say was that it was put to him that if the problem of the Hand was not solved there would be trouble. There was no way of solving it, short of accommodation with the Ethiopians, except by war. The Ethiopian administration in the Reserved Area was getting closer and more competent. In the past it had been remote and at times ruthless and cruel. He had been told that the pattern of life on the Ethiopian side of the border was slowly changing. Many nomads were turning to agriculture and were settling down in villages. Of course this meant that the chiefs on our side ware losing control over their own people and were growing angry and bitter about it. This might lead to the kind of situation which the questioner envisaged. As against that there were quite a number of Somali leaders who felt that if only accommodation could be reached which would ensure that their people could move over to the Haud and come back without undue pressure being put upon them, some sort of understanding could be reached.

Asked about the question of language, Mr. BRAINE said he understood that Somali was a language which could not be written. In Somalia English was being taught in the schools by Egyptian teachers. He was interested to learn that one of the most powerful figures in that country was learning English. Indeed, there seemed to be a passionate desire to learn English. Somalis complained bitterly to us that although English was the important language in the world we did not send teachers. The number of educated people was very small. Most of these were English or Italian spoken, having received their primary education in the days of the British military occupation and their higher education from the Italians. Arabic was taught in the schools and might well be the language for that part of the world in the course of time.

Asked about the attitude of the British officials in the Protectorate with regard to speeding up political development, Mr. BRAINE said that a good deal of money was now being spent on the Protectorate and things could be speeded up. But the standards sot were high. The administration feels that if money is to be spent on equipping people to stand on their own feet it must be properly spent. That is fair enough where time is on our side. Unfortunately the start in the Protectorate had been made later than in other territories. He was impressed by the head of one service who was doing his level best to train young Somalis and admitted that he was taking risks. The situation was such that risks simply had to be taken; he would prefer to err on that side. One had to recognise that too rapid an advance could lead to difficulties at a later stage, but by 1960, we might well be out of the Protectorate in the sense of being the administering body, though he hoped we would long remain in that part of the world providing providing guidance and aid. He thought that was what the Somalis wanted, not only in Somaliland but in Somalia. They were anxious we should remain as friends, guides and philosophers, but they wanted to feel that they were a sovereign independent and free people.

The CHAIRMAN, closing the discussion, said that this was an area of extraordinary fascination and the problems could not be solved in a vacuum. The Somalis were at the mercy of outside powers and stresses. It was not an area rich in natural resources, it was extraordinarily needy. Mr. Braine had shown every possible sign of sympathy with these emergent and struggling peoples so diverse and attractive, his account was in the highest degree authentic, he had given an account of their thoughts, he was not unduly hopeful or entirely pessimistic, he left it to the Government and the world at large to find solutions for these matters which were highly baffling. The audience was extremely grateful to him for his address, throwing light on this important subject and stimulating interest in a matter which somehow had to be solved.